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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
DAVID F. MATCHETr, JR.
The plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries sustained when he was
struck by an automobile driven by the defendant. To rebut testimony as
to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries the defendant offered in evidence
motion pictures of the plaintiff showing him engaged in physical activi-
ties. The pictures were admitted in evidence. Plaintiff appealed from an
adverse judgment, asserting that admission of these pictures was error.
The judgment was affirmed. Proper foundation having been laid, the
pictures were admissible, notwithstanding that an eye witness was pres-
ent in court and could testify to seeing the activity and that an em-
ployee of defendant may have persuaded plaintiff to do the acts shown
by the pictures.
This decision, in McGoorty v. Benhart,' is the first of its kind in a
court of review in Illinois, although the question has arisen in nisi prius
courts.
2
In a comparatively recent case before an Illinois court of review the
court indicated motion pictures were proper evidence in certain cases
but held that the evidence was immaterial to the issues involved. 3
Motion pictures have for a long time been in regular use before com-
missions, and other like tribunals, and have been displayed to juries in a
number of states. 4
It is now almost universally conceded that, at least in cases where
the principal purpose is impeachment, motion pictures are admissible if
proper foundation is laid.5 Cases of exclusion are generally cases in
which no adequate foundation has been laid. 6 Since the foundation laid is
most important, the bar generally must bear in mind the proper ap-
proach. Testimony must be introduced concerning the competency of
the operator, the mechanism and operation of the camera used, the
type of film, the conditions of exposure, the circumstances of developing,
including the competency of the person performing the service. The
film should be identified. Testimony should be offered concerning the
construction and operation of the projector showing it to be in perfect
1 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E. (2d) 289 (1940).
2 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.) § 798a, p. 206; Herbert H. Kennedy, "Motion
Pictures in Evidence," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 424 (1932).
3 Ottenstroer v. Belt Ry. Co. of Chicago, 272 Ill. App. 615 (1933).
4 Herbert H. Kennedy, "Motion Pictures in Evidence," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 424 (1932).
5 9 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (Perm. Ed.), § 6383,
p. 873; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.), § 798a; Boyarsky v. G. A. Zimmerman
Corp., 270 N.Y.S. 134 (1934), noted in 19 Minn. L. Rev. 124; Snyder v. American
Car & Foundry Co., 322 Mo. 147, 14 S.W. (2d) 603 (1929); Charles Calvin Scott,
"Legal Photography, Part VI" 3 Kan. City L. Rev. 83 (1935); Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Worthy, 9 S.W. (2d) 388 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
6 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marks, 230 Ala. 417, 161 So. 543 (1935); Gibson
v. Gunn, 202 N.Y.S. 19 (1923); Cf. DeCamp v. United States, 10 F.(2d) 984 (1926).
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working condition, and the size and type of screen, together with the
distance of the projector therefrom should be revealed.7
In preparing motion pictures for use in evidence, it has been sug-
gested that the photographer use a rented camera instead- of his own,
thus enabling the dealer to give independent testimony as to the time
when the camera was rented and tending to establish the time when
the picture was taken and eliminating charges of tricks; that the film
should be purchased from the same dealer for like reasons; that after
taking, it be returned to the same dealer for processing and be run
through the projector for his benefit for purposes of identification; that
enough of the surroundings should appear in the picture to enable one
to testify where it was taken; and that the film should be kept in its
original state, without cuts or splices. 8
While the chief use of the motion picture has been in the field of expos-
ing fraud in personal injury cases 9 it has also been otherwise employed.
A sound motion picture has been displayed to rebut a contention that a
confession in a criminal case was obtained by coercion.10
Its use to portray a reconstructed scene was not permitted. 1' The
court there determined that there was no accurate reproduction of the
scene and there was risk of manipulation. The court held, however, that
the decision as to admissibility, depending as it does on circumstances,
should be left to the trial court. Hence the question of admissibility
generally is still open.
There is a strong possibility that in the future records on appeal will
consist of sound pictures of the trial.12 Such procedure, while now too
costly, would simplify the work of appellate courts while at the same
time extending the scope of review.
Whatever may be the future attitude of the court to motion pictures
it would seem that in the decision in the instant case the court has
taken a forward step in the law of evidence. Whatever operates to expose
malingerers promotes honesty in the legal profession and aids in securing
the prompt payment of legitimate damage claims.
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
ACTIONS-ABOLITION OF DISTINCTIONS As To FORM-AvAABILrTY OF MOTION
IN NATURE or CORAM NoBis IN CHANCERY PROCEEDINGs.-The remedy in the
nature of a writ of error coram nobis under the Illinois Civil Practice
Act enabling correction by motion of "all errors in fact, committed in
the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by the common law,
could have been corrected by said writ" has been held inapplicable to
7 Kennedy, "Motion Pictures in Evidence," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 424 (1932).
8 Charles Calvin Scott, "Legal Photography, Part VI," 3 Kans. City L. Rev. 83
(1935).
9 Sweet, "The Motion Picture as a Fraud Detector," 21 Am. Bar Jour. 653.
10 Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 125 (1930).
11 State v. United Railways & Electric Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 A. 916 (1932).
12 Charles Calvin Scott, "Legal Photography, Part VI," 3 Kan. City L. Rev. 83
(1935).
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proceedings in chancery in a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court' re-
versing a decision by the Appellate Court heretofore noted.
2
The case is of considerable significance with regard to the extent of
the merger between law and equity effected by the Civil Practice Act. 8
In this connection, the court stated that "it was the obvious intention
[of the legislators] to do away with forms of pleading but to preserve
separate procedure in law and equity."' 4 If this doctrine is carried to a
logical conclusion, it may be expected that the attempted merger be-
tween law and equity, except for purposes of pleading, will produce little
of significance in Illinois. W. L. SCHLFGEL, JR.
COMPLAINT-MoTION To DIsMIss-EFFECT OF RENEWING MOTION To Dis-
Miss AFTER EARLIER DENIAL THEREF.-In the case of McGraw v. Oelig'
one of the defendants, acting in a representative capacity, filed
a counterclaim against certain of his co-defendants to recover for the
wrongful death of his intestate. A motion to dismiss the counterclaim 2
was presented on the ground that the same could not be maintained
since the person whose negligence caused the death was one of the next
of kin and would be entitled to a distributive share in any recovery.3
This motion having been denied, the counter-defendants answered and
a trial was had resulting in a verdict in favor of the counterclaimant.
Upon motion, a new trial was granted. Thereafter the counter-defendant,
upon leave of court, 4 withdrew his answer and filed another motion to
dismiss the counterclaim predicated on the same ground above-men-
tioned. 5 This motion, over counterclaimants' objection that the point hav-
ing been once determined adversely could not be reconsidered, was
granted, and, counterclaimant electing to stand by his pleading, judg-
ment was entered dismissing the same. On appeal therefrom, held:
judgment affirmed, the trial court being allowed to retain discretionary
control over the pleadings until final jugdment.
Although there is no express precedent for such decision since the
adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, at least where the case had
proceeded as far as the instant one, an earlier decision under the for-
' Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N.E.(2d) 424 (1941).
2See 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REViEw 276 where the facts of the case are stated.
3 See Roger L. Severns, "Equity and 'Fusion' in Illinois," 18 CHICAGo-KEN'T LAW
REviEw 333 (1940).
4 Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 444, 34 N.E.(2d) 424 (1941).
1 309 III. App. 628, 33 N.E. (2d) 758 (1941).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 169. Motions under this section, equivalent to
general demurrers under the former procedure, may be presented where a plead-
ing "is substantially insufficient in law."
3 Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392, 30. A.L.R.
491. (1923); Ohnesorge v. Chicago City Railway Co., 259 Ill. 424, 102 N.E. 819 (1913).
See also, as to other comparable situations, Gregory, "Imputed Contributory
Negligence," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1935).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939 Ch. 110, § 170.
5 The counterclaimant filed a motion to strike the motion to dismiss. For the
propriety of "demurring to a demurrer" see Bohnert v. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 362
Il. 403, 200 N.E. 326 (1936), and note thereon in 14 CHICAGo-KENT REMw 185 (1936).
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mer system of procedure dealt with the identical problem in the same
fashion. 6 The instant result was also foreshadowed by the holding in
Municipal Employes Insurance Association of Chicago v. Taylor7 de-
cided since the adoption of the present Practice Act, although in that
case the two motions to dismiss were presented before the trial stage
had been reached, and the second one had been filed without leave be-
ing granted. There is, however, no logical difference between the two
cases, since the granting of a motion for a new trial puts the case back
to the pleading stage, during which the trial court should have full dis-
cretion to permit amendments, strike pleadings, and in general control
the steps affecting the ultimate disposition of the case. To deny the
trial court power to reverse its own earlier erroneous rulings occurring
during the pleading stage would produce the ridiculous result of forcing
an appellate tribunal to do the work of the trial court. C. WHITMAN
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-FAILURE To FILE REPLY To ANswER-WHETHER Mo-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPERATES AS WAIVER OF FAILURE To FILE
REPLY.-An interesting sidelight has been thrown on the procedure for
securing a summary judgment in certain types of actions by the decision
in Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Haaker.1 In that case a judgment creditor of
a closed state bank filed suit against certain of the stockholders to secure
satisfaction. One defendant filed a verified answer, to which no reply2
was filed. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff moved for a summary judgment
in accordance with the provisions of Section 57 of the Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act,8 supporting its motion with affidavits as provided by Rule 15 of
the Illinois Supreme Court. 4 In opposition, the defendant filed counter-
affidavits, but did not deny the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint
or in the affidavits made in support of the motion. Plaintiff's motion was
accordingly granted and judgment was entered. Defendant appealed,
relying on two grounds, to wit: (1) the case was not one falling within the
purview of the summary judgment procedure; and (2) the failure of the
plaintiff to file a reply to defendant's answer, which amounted to an ad-
mission of the matter contained therein, 5 hence judgment should have
been rendered for the defendant. Judgment was affirmed.
The provisions for summary judgment apply only to actions "upon a
contract, express or implied, or upon a judgment or decree for the pay-
ment of money, or in any action to recover the possession of land or ...
specific chattels." 6 The defendant contended that since the plaintiff's
6 Shaw v. Dorris, 290 Ill. 196, 124 N.E. 796 (1919).
7 300 Ill. App. 231, 20 N.E.(2d) 835 (1939).
1 309 Ill. App. 406, 33 N.E.(2d) 154 (1941).
2 Despite the language of § 32 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.,
1939, Ch. 110, § 156), the courts still persist in denominating the third stage of
pleading as a "replication," following the terminology of common law pleading.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 181.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.15(1).
5 On this see § 40(2) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act; Ill. Rev. Stat., 1939,
Ch. 110, § 164(2).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 181.
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claim originally arose out of an ultra vires contract of bailment followed
by a conversion of the bailed chattels, the summary judgment procedure
was not available. The court, nevertheless, held that the plaintiff, by
reducing its claim against the closed bank to judgment, had changed the
same into a contractual demand against the stockholders,7 clearly justi-
fying the use of the more expeditious device of the motion for summary
judgment.
The second point relied on was that by failure to file a reply the plain-
tiff had admitted the facts alleged in the defendant's answer. This the
court also found to be groundless. In an earlier case,8 the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that the failure to file a reply may be regarded as a
waiver of the right to do so if the parties proceed to trial without ques-
tioning the omission. While the motion for summary judgment is not a
"trial" of the cause in the sense indicated by that decision, it is, never-
theless, an inquisition to determine if any factual question exists which
needs to be tried, and the defendant, by joining therein, through the use
of counter-affidavits, must now be regarded as waiving the defect as
effectively as if he had gone to trial and offered proof. The applicability
of the analogy thus drawn can hardly be challenged. C. WfTMAN
7 Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Il. 409, 116 N.E. 273 (1917). See also Civil Practice
Act Annotated, (Foundation Press, 1933) p. 137, where the annotator suggests that
the term "implied contract" as used in the summary judgment section includes
contracts "implied in law."
s Watt v. Cecil, 368 111. 510, 15 N.E.(2d) 292 (1938). See also Ford Motor Co. V.
National Bond and Investment Co., 294 Ill. App. 585, 14 N.E. (2d) 306 (1938).
